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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and .Appellee,

v.
LANE D. BIRD,
Defendant and .Appellant.
.Appellate Case No.: 20140434-CA

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE INVENTORY HAD NO VALUE
AT THE TIME MARKHAM TOOK POSSESSION, NOR THAT THE
LIABILITIES OF THE COMPANY CONSISTENTLY OUTWEIGHED
THE ASSETS TO RENDER THE ASSETS/INVENTORY "WORTHLESS."
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-201(4) states as follows:

(c) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court,
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 63M-7-503 and 77-38a-401, shall
enter:
(i) a civil judgment for complete restitution for the full amount of
expenses paid on behalf of the victim by the Utah Office for Victims
of Crime; ...

"In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and courtordered restitution." UTAH CODE ANN. §77-381-302(2); see also State v. Laycock, 2009

UT 53, ,r20, 214 P.3d 104. Complete restitution is the amount of')'estitution necessary to
compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant" UTAH CODE ANN. §77-381302(2)(a).

Court-ordered restitution, on the other hand, is '1:he restinition the court
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having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay." UTAH CODE ANN. §77-381302(2)(b). The amount of court-ordered restitution does not have to be equal to the
amount of complete restitution, and its determination is highly discretionary. See,
Laycock at ,I 28.
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-38a-302(5)(c)(iv) states, in pertinent part, that " ... [i]n

determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the
court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: ... (iv) other
circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate." UTAH
CODE ANN. §77-38a-302(5)(b) states that, "[i]n determining the monetary sum and other

conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the ... loss if the offense resulted in ... loss ... of property of a victim of

the offense." In State v. Robinson it was held that, "[r]estitution should be ordered only in
cases where liability is clear as a matter of law and where commission of the crime
clearly establishes causality of the ... damages." Ibid., 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App.
1993).
"In determining the amount of complete restitution, Utah courts employ '[a]
modified "but for" test,' which 'requires (1) that the damages would not have occurred
but for the conduct underlying the [defendant's] ... conviction and (2) that the causal
nexus between the [criminal] conduct and the loss . . . not [be] too attenuated (either
factually or temporally)." State v. Ruiz, 2013 UT App 166, ,I8, 305 P.3d 223 ("Ruiz r'),
citing State v. Harvell, 2009 UT App 271, ,I 12, 220 P.3d 174 (alterations and omissions
in original)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Accordingly, a defendant
2
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may be ordered to pay restitution only for pecuniary loss resulting from a crime he either

was convicted of or admitted responsibility for." Id. at ,r 9; see UTAH CODE ANN. §7738a-302(1); State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, ,r 16, 40P.3d1143.
As it specifically pertains to liability for damages under the Utah Uniform
Securities Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-22(l)(b) states as follows:
The person to whom the person ... is liable [for a security violation] may
sue at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security,
together with interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, costs, and
reasonable attorney fees, less the amount of income received on the
security, ... "
UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-22(l)(c)(i)(A)(n and (II) directs damages to be

calculated by

"subtract[ing] from the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender under Subsection
(7)(b) the value of the security when the buyer disposed of the security; ... '' adding 12%
per year beginning on the date the security is purchased by the buyer and ending on the
date of disposition. Under subsection (7)(b) it states as follows:
A person may not sue under this section if (i) the buyer or seller received a
written offer, before suit and at a time when the buyer or seller owned the
security, to refund the consideration paid together with interest at 12% per
year from the date of payment, less the amotmt of any income received on
the security, and the buyer or seller failed to accept the offer within 30 days
of its receipt; or (ii) the buyer or seller received such an offer before suit
and at a time when the buyer or seller did not own the security, unless the
buyer or seller rejected the offer in writing within 30 days of its receipt

Ibid.
The charges herein arise from Markham investing $247,000 with Bird into Claron
Labs in approximately March of 2007, which Markham believed went towards upgrading
the machinery the company already possessed. Bird was excluded from the Company a

3
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few months later. Markham was given all inventory 1 and used it to continue
manufacturing and producing product under his own new company, CBCL, until his own
product was found to be unsafe by the FDA a couple of years later. By Ruling, Bird was
ordered to pay Markham the amount of his investment, $247,000, in restitution. R0155.
However, the court off-set this amount by $82,276.83 for the assets of the Company
absorbed by Markham, including labelers, drill presses, greenhouses, processing
machinery, raw ingredients, desks, computers, and office/lab equipment.

Id.

The

remaining amount of $164,723.17 was ordered to be paid by Bird in restitution to
Markham. R0156.

In its evaluation, the trial court omitted the fact that Markham had also received
inventory valued at over a million dollars, with such valuation provided by his own
testimony. No off-set for inventory was made to the restitution amount. Id. The trial
court believed the FDA's shut down of Markham's own company, CBCL, and seizure of
its then-inventory, rendered the inventory transferred to Markham two (2) years earlier by
Bird as valueless and thus not to be used to offset restitution. Id. Bird challenged this
determination in his opening brief herein.

In the Brief of Appellee the State argues that even though Bird returned the
inventory to Markham, that the inventory was ''worthless'' and CBCL did not make any
money, leaving Markham inadequately compensated for his investment Appellee 's Brief

1

There seems to be a dispute regarding valuation of the inventory given to Markham;
however, the State's brief concedes the evidence shows it was worth at least $500,000.
See, Brief ofAppellee at p. 11 n. 3, citing R346: 125, 156 (Susan's testimony); R347:346
(a salesman); and R347:379 (Defendant).
4
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at p. 21. However, the State has failed to point to any valuation evidence to support that
the inventory was "worthless" at the time Bird returned it to Markham. In fact,

Markham's own testimony was that the inventory was worth millions when it transferred
to him. R343:30; R0344:4.
Bird was only convicted because he was not a licensed security broker or dealer

when the transaction took place. R0344:3. When the dissolution of the original company
and formation of the second company, CBCL, took place, CBCL acquired all assets from
the original company, included physical equipment and inventory. Markham himself
valued the inventory absorbed by CBCL to be at $1-1.5 Million, more than sufficient to
offset the Markhams $247,000 investment. R0344:4. Markham sold around 800,000
bottles of product as CBCL, with profits in the $6M million dollar range at wholesale
cost-36 times the amount ordered for restitution in the Ru.ling herein. R344:4. Bird
received none of those profits since he was not involved with CBCL. The State argued
below and in briefing that CBCL had more liabilities than assets and never made a profit
for Markham; however, no evidence was presented to support that Markham bad not
made a profit, at least one sufficient to offset the restitution amount of $164,723.17 prior
to being shut down. Such a profit can be presumed from the gross sales of at least $6M
(not addressed by the State's brief at all) and the fact that CBCL operated for two (2)
years before being closed by the FDA. R0344 :5-6.
If Markham made no profit whatsoever from CBCL 's operations from the assets
and inventory and for two (2) years of CBCL operating, then financial records should
have been required to prove such matters before ordering restitution against Bird. This is
5
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particularly true given that the State claims the original company had liabilities exceeding
the worth of the assets/inventory when Markham took possession; however, there is no
evidence those assets/inventory were seized from Markham by the original company's
creditors to support the State's argument Nor did the State present any evidence of debts
of the original company that were paid by the Markham's to contradict their return of
their investment through assets/inventory. The State's brief boldly states that Markham's
assumed the debts of the original company, but the record on appeal is devoid of any
evidence of this and the State provides no record citations supporting its statement. See,
ibid. at p. 37. Given the lack of evidence as to debts, then the original company's assets

can be presumed to exceed their liabilities since Markham was able to retain possession
of the assets/inventory to compensate for his investment and even open a new company
(CBCL) with those assets/inventory as a basis for operations. The State had the burden of
proving restitution was appropriate; however, they presented no evidence on any of these
pertinent matters below and cannot now make bold unsupported statements on appeal to
compensate. See, UT. R. APP. P. 24.
Restitution is meant to compensate Markham for all of the losses caused by Bird.
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-381-302(2)(a)-(b). This is calculated as the actual loss, not some

presumed or speculated amount. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-38a-302(5)(b). Bird's liability
was not proven by the State to be "clear as a matter of law" nor did his crime "clearly
establish causality" of Markham's claimed loss of original investment from being shut
down two (2) years later under his own company he voluntarily opted to operate.
Robinson at 983. Markham did not incur business losses in CBCL "but for" Bird's
6
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security violation. Ruiz I at

,rs, citing Harvell at 1[12. The compensation of assets

and

inventory in the millions of dollars in exchange for Markham's $247,000 investment
cannot be traced forever into the future with any prospective misuse of it by the one
compensated (Markham) always attributable to Bird forever. The compensation for loss
occurred at the time of transfer of the assets and inventory to Markham. Whatever
Markham chose to do in the future with his compensation then became attenuated from
Bird's actions as both a factual and temporal break in any causal nexus for restitution
purposes. Restitution is not intended to compensate victims from their own choices after
receiving compensation, but only to compensate for loss resulting from the crime itself.
Ruiz I at 19; see UTAH CODE ANN. §77-38a-302(1 ); Mast at tJ 16.
This is made evidence in the codes specifically pertaining to liability for damages

under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-22(1)(b) states that
Markham could sue Bird at law or in equity to recover the $247,000 paid for the security;
however, this is calculated with "less the amount of income received on the security."
Calculation also requires subtracting the amount already received by Markham when
Markham disposed of the security. UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-22(l)(c)(i)(A)(I) and (II).
This disposal occurred when the original company was dissolved and closed; however,
Markham walked away with all of the assets and inventory to adequately compensate his
$247,000 investment or security. Thus, at that time be had no recoverable amount. He
had received a full return-or more--on his security. Bird had "refunded" Markham's
consideration for the security. UTAH CODE ANN. §61-1-22(7)(b). Even if the security in
the original dissolved company was believed to have perpetuated into CBCL, which it
7
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could not have based on dissolution principles, Markham made income2 on the security
(now in the form of assets and inventory) totaling $6M or more under simple calculation
of wholesale price for the 800,000 bottles sold in the two (2) years before the FDA shut
down CBCL. This income is also required to be subtracted when determining Bird's
liability to Markham. UTAH CODE ANN. §61-l-22(7)(b). In essence, the written
communications between Markham and Bird pertaining to Markham talcing all assets and
inventory in exchange for his consideration on the security met the requirements of UTAH
CODE ANN. §61-1-22(7)(b) to disallow any restitution order for Markham.
The inventory was not worthless when Bird left the company and Markham took
possession of it. The parties had agreed for Markham to take the assets and inventory in
exchange for his consideration on the security. It was not for the trial court to determine
whether the inventory had value or not since it was the bargain between Markham and
Bird for return of Markham's consideration. Nonetheless, it is clear that the inventory had
value to Markham, who voluntarily determined to take this return on his consideration
and make a profit from it under a new company he himself formed without Bird-a profit
that exceeded 30 times his investment. Markham suffered no loss and the inventory
should have either been considered an offset or part of the parties' agreement for return
of Markham's full consideration.

The State's brief continues to claim Markham never made any profit at all, as contested
by Bird herein; however, it concedes that Bill received a check for $1,129.27. Ibid. at p.
12, citing R346:78; SE8 at 7. Restitution was never offset at all for this "income" as
required by statute. See. UTAH CODE ANN. §61-l-22(l)(b).
:?

8
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At the time Bird ceased his involvement with the original company, Markham had
been compensated for his investment. Bird is not liable to Markham for any further
compensation and no evidence was presented to show that the inventory was worthless at
the time that Bird returned it to Markham. Markham has been justly compensated with
the return of the inventory and thus, no other restitution was necessary.

THE SEIZURE OF THE PRODUCT BY THE FDA AND THE FAILURE
OF THE COMPANY WAS NOT FORSEEABLE BY BIRD AND BE WAS
NO LONGER INVOLVED WITH THE COMPANY WHEN IT
OCCURRED THUS, THE STATE HAS NOT PRESENTED A PROPER
"BUT FOR" ANALYSIS.

Il.

The "but for" analysis associated with restitution determinations was recently set
forth as follows:

In determining the amount of complete restitution, Utah courts employ ' [a]
modified "but for" test,' which 'requires ( 1) that the damages would not
have occurred but for the conduct underlying the [defendant's] ...
conviction and (2) that the causal nexus between the [criminal] conduct and
the loss ... not [be] too attenuated (either factually or temporally)."

State v. Ruiz, 2013 UT App 166, ,rs, 305 P.3d 223, citing State v. Harvell, 2009 UT App
271,

,r

12, 220 P.3d 174 (alterations and omissions in original)(citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). In State v. Johnson this Court emphasized that the restitution
statutes require a "'sufficient nexus' between the defendant's criminal conduct and the
pecuniary damages suffered by the victim." Ibid., 2009 UT App 382, ,J46, 224 P.3d 720.

In the matter of State v. Poulsen that the nexus between the criminal conduct and the loss
must be established by more than bare bone proffers. It discusses this as follows:
Poulsen maintains that "[t]he record is too sparse, the facts too elusive, the
liability too attenuated, and the causation too concluso.ry for anyone to be
able to establish that the participatory acts admitted to are the source of the
9
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putative injury." We would not go that far. Poulsen did stipulate that the
victims' net loss was $168,400. And the State produced photocopies of
negotiable instruments from which that amount was calculated. But these
bare bones proffers do not flesh out "the causal nexus between the
[criminal] conduct and the loss," leaving little basis to determine whether
that nexus ''is not too attenuated (either factually or temporally)." See State
v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, 111, 221 P.3d 273 (alteration in original)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Poulsen did not plead
guilty to robbery or a similar crime where the causal nexus between the
defendant's act and the victim's loss is readily apparent; he pied guilty to
participating in a pyramid scheme. The nexus between his participation and
these victims' losses is not obvious. Indeed, the record does not even
indicate precisely what Poulsen said or did. Moreover, he repeatedly and
strenuously objected to the lack of such a factual connection.
Ibid. 2012 UT App 292, ,Jl6, 286 P.3d 601. Merriam Webster defines "foreseeable" as
"being

such

as

may

be

reasonably

anticipated."

http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/foreseeable.

In the instant matter the State has argued that the seizure by the FDA was
foreseeable and that the Markham's loss occurred when they invested in the company
because of the state of the company at the time. Brief of Appellee at p. 37. The State
argues that the state of the company at the time of the Markham's investment was enough
for it to be reasonably foreseeable that the company would fail. Id. The State is mistaken

in this argument.
Markham invested in the company and within a few months was running it
without Bird. After a couple of years Markham voluntarily approached the FDA about
becoming approved by them in the hopes of boosting sales. The FDA inspected the
premises and informed Markham that there were several things that he would need to do
in order to meet the FDA standards. The FDA gave Markham a few months to make the
IO
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necessary changes. During this process the FDA had taken samples of the product,
discovered that bacteria was present, and later seized the product This, coupled with the
fact that the changes necessary to meet FDA approval would cost between $1.2-1.5
million, and that because they could not produce product anymore the operation was shut
down. The trial court believed this was when Markham's loss for restitution purposes
occurred.
Up until this time Markham was working to make the operation profitable and was
selling some product. There was no indication prior to the FDA' s involvement that the
business was not or would not become profitable regardless of its condition when
Markham took over. Thus, the ultimate demise of the business was nor foreseeable by
Bird and the State's "but for'' analysis is flawed.

.

Merriam Webster defines "foreseeable" as "being such as may be reasonably
anticipated." No evidence presented by the State indicated that the specific factors
impacting the FDA shutdown were present when Bird and Markham were operating the
original company. No evidence supports the fact that Bird lmew or should have known
what would transpire later, particularly since it was Markham's voluntary decision to
continue operations under his own business, invest another $193,000 of his own money
(R346: I 08), and seek FDA approval for the product in hopes of generating more profit.
Bird could not reasonably foresee Markham's personal business choices in these matters.
Markham could have liquidated the assets and inventory, likely recouping his $247,000
investment and more since they were valued at more than this amount-at least twice that
($500,000 for inventory plus $82,276.83 asset valuation from the court in the Ruling)
11
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from even the State's concessions in its brief. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 11 n. 3, citing
R346:125, 156; R347:346; and R347:379.
Although the State tries to tie the original company in with CBCL as the same
continuing '4venture" to prolong the determination of when "loss" occurred, this
contradicts standard principles of contract and business law where the original company
was dissolved and CBCL created thereafter with different partners and without Bird's
involvement or authorization. Any loss of Markham's investment occurred at the time the
original company closed and dissolved, not when CBCL closed. As argued in the opening
brief and supra, Markham received the return on his consideration for the security
through talcing possession of all of the assets and inventory at the time of dissolution. The
question of Markham's loss was resolved at that point in time. It did not perpetuate
according to what Markham decided to do with his compensation thereafter. Restitution
does not provide double or triple redress dependent upon the victim's choices as to what
they did with their compensation. If a victim squanders their compensation, they cannot
come back and request more based on their own misguided choices.
This process undermines the ''but for" analysis used in determining restitution by
the trial court by focusing instead on requiring the compensation to always be in
existence after it is given. Once compensation is made, the receiver of it has the right to
do with it what they please; however, the law does not allow them to come back and ask
for double redress if they make misguided choices with that compensation. For instance,
someone receiving restitution for medical costs can chose not to use the money to pay the
medical bills; however, they cannot return to the court to have those same bills paid later
12
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when the medical providers seek payment. The same is similar here. Markham cannot
~·•'.-

receive the assets and inventory totaling more than his investment, then use those assets
and inventory in misguided efforts to make a profit under a new company name, and
come back and seek double redress when his own business decisions fail. His
co~ensation for his investment is not required to exist forever in order for him to have
been compensated, and particularly if he makes misguided decisions with it as he did
herein. This would render the "but for" test meaningless.
It cannot be shown that had it not been for Bird's security violation that CBCL
would have thrived. Ruiz at 1{8. The business was shut down because Markham asked the
FDA for an inspection so it could become FDA approved in hopes that this would help
generate more income for CBCL. Bird had no involvement in this. Bird had no way of
knowing what it would cost to meet the FDA standards for their approval. He had left the
company two (2) years earlier and had never talked to the FDA.
Bird's security violation had no effect on the actions that Markham took nearly
two (2) years later. Thus, the first element cannot be met There is also no nexus
between Bird's conduct and the eventual loss of the inventory and eventual closure of
CBCL. Johnson at ,i46. Bird was out of the picture and had been for quite some time
when the FDA became involved and CBCL was closed. Bird's crime and the closure of
the business have no connection. Markham involved the FDA of his own accord, and was
still working the business for almost two (2) years after the original company dissolved.
As Bird was not even connected to the company at the time of the seizure and closure

there is no nexus to the closure.
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Poulsen requires more than bare bone proffers for a nexus to be established. Ibid.
at 116. The State's evidence was required to show that Bird's security violation-not
being a broker when he entered an agreement with Markham-are the source of CBCL
closing. This was not and cannot be shown by the evidence on record in this matter. Bird
had nothing to do with CBCL nor could he foresee its closure would occur. Thus, the
State's "but for" analysis is flawed and the Ruling requiring Bird to pay restitution to
Markham should be reversed.

CONCLUSION

•
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Bird respectfully request that this Court
reverse his conviction and restitution order and take any such further action as this Court
deems necessary.
th

DATED TIIlS 10 day of June, 2016.
)

~
kG. Williams
Attorney for Lane Bird

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH R.. APP. P. 24(f)(l)(C)
. . _Counsel hereby certifies the Brief of Appellant complies with the type-volume
limitation:
words are contained herein, in compliance with UTAH R APP. P.
24(t)(l)(A) and was detennined by the word processing system used to prepare Brief of
Appellant.
f

th

DATED this 10 day of June, 2016.

Derek G. Williams
Attorney for Lane Bird
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